Ariel Cook

Abstract

This paper examines the Latin etymological foundations of psychological terminology and analyzes how linguistic choices in Western psychology reflect and reinforce specific cultural, religious, and political assumptions. Through examination of key Latin roots—including those related to mind, emotion, behavior, addiction, and anxiety—this analysis demonstrates that psychological language is not neutral but rather architecturally embedded with assumptions about selfhood, normality, pathology, and social order. The standardization of psychology through Latin and English terminology represents not merely scientific precision but the naturalization of Euro-American, Christian, and capitalist frameworks as universal truths. This paper argues that understanding these etymological foundations is essential for recognizing how language shapes psychological reality and for developing more culturally reflexive approaches to mental health.

Keywords: etymology, Latin roots, history of psychology, cultural psychology, language and cognition, medical terminology, power and knowledge

---

Introduction

Language does not simply describe reality; it constructs it (Whorf, 1956). In psychology, the technical vocabulary that claims to objectively categorize human experience is deeply rooted in Latin, a language carrying the weight of Roman law, Catholic doctrine, and European imperialism (Danziger, 1997). When 19th-century psychology professionalized and sought scientific legitimacy, it borrowed heavily from Latin and Greek terminology, creating an appearance of timeless, universal truths while actually encoding specific cultural assumptions about personhood, rationality, morality, and social order (Rose, 1998).

This paper explores the etymological foundations of psychological language, demonstrating how Latin roots reveal underlying assumptions that shape contemporary theory and practice. By examining the linguistic architecture of psychology, we can better understand how Western standardization reflects particular historical, religious, and political contexts rather than culture-free scientific objectivity (Cushman, 1995). This analysis has important implications for cross-cultural psychology, mental health equity, and the decolonization of psychological knowledge (Gone, 2013; Kirmayer & Minas, 2000).

Foundational Latin Roots in Psychological Terminology

Core Experiential Terms

The fundamental vocabulary of psychology reveals assumptions about the nature of mind and experience. The term psychology itself derives from psyche (Greek for “soul” or “mind”), later Latinized and secularized but retaining its association with an interior, essential self (Smith, 1988). This is complemented by Latin roots that construct mental life:

Mens or mentis (“mind”) appears in “mental,” “dementia,” and “mentality,” establishing the mind as a thing one possesses rather than a process one engages in. Cogito or cogitare (“to think”) yields “cognition” and “recognize,” privileging rational thought as the defining feature of consciousness—a distinctly Cartesian assumption (Damasio, 1994). Sentire (“to feel” or “perceive”) creates “sense,” “sentiment,” and “sentient,” while percipere (“to grasp” or “understand”) gives us “perception” and “apperception.”

Anima (“soul,” “breath,” “life force”) provides “animate” and “animation,” connecting psychological life to vitality itself. Yet the translation of anima and psyche into scientific terminology strips away their original spiritual and relational meanings (Hillman, 1975). Conscientia (“knowing with”) becomes “consciousness” and “conscience,” secularizing what was originally a moral and religious concept about knowing with God or knowing right from wrong (Taylor, 1989).

Emotional and Affective Language

The vocabulary of emotion reveals particularly strong moral and religious influences. Affectus (“state of mind” or “emotion”) gives us the modern clinical term “affect,” while emotio (“moving out” or “disturbance”) directly provides “emotion,” framing feeling as disruption to a presumed rational baseline (Dixon, 2003). Passio (“suffering” or “enduring”) becomes “passion” and “passive,” carrying Christian theological weight—the Passio Christi referred to Christ’s suffering. This etymological heritage positions passion as something that happens to us, opposed to rational action we control (Solomon, 1993).

Dolor (“pain” or “grief”) appears in “dolorous” and “condolence,” while the opposition between ratio (“reason,” “calculation”) and passio structures Western thought around a fundamental binary between rational mind and emotional body, a dualism questioned by contemporary affective neuroscience but deeply embedded in our language (Panksepp, 1998).

Structural Concepts of Self

Freud’s famous tripartite structure relies entirely on Latin: ego (“I”), id (“it”), and super (“above”) in “superego.” These terms are not merely descriptive but performative—they create distinct entities from what might otherwise be understood as processes or relationships (Bettelheim, 1983). The English translations of Freud’s original German terms (Ich, Es, Über-Ich) used Latinate forms specifically to create scientific-sounding objectivity (Bettelheim, 1983).

Socius (“companion”) creates “social” and “society,” while personae (“theatrical mask”) becomes “personality.” This etymology is revealing: in Roman theater, personae were masks actors wore to amplify their voices and signify their roles. Christianity transformed this into the unified, continuous, morally responsible individual soul—a concept modern personality psychology assumes rather than questions (Baumeister, 1987). Alternative cultural conceptions of selfhood as multiple, contextual, or relational are linguistically marginalized (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

Pathology, Deviation, and Normality

The language of mental disorder reveals how moral judgment masquerades as medical description. Morbus (“disease”) appears in “morbid,” while pathos (Greek, “suffering”) combines with Latin forms to create “pathology” and “psychopath.” Deviare (“to turn from the path”) yields “deviance” and “deviation,” encoding a spatial metaphor where there is a correct path and movement away from it constitutes pathology (Hacking, 1995).

Crucially, norma (“carpenter’s square” or “rule”) gives us “normal” and “abnormal.” This reveals that normality is not a discovered natural kind but a standard imposed from outside—the carpenter’s square that determines what is straight (Davis, 1995). Yet psychological discourse treats normalcy as descriptive fact rather than prescriptive judgment (Canguilhem, 1989).

Alienus (“belonging to another,” “foreign”) creates “alienation” and “alienist” (an early term for psychiatrist). To be mentally ill was to be alien—foreign to oneself, belonging to another realm, estranged from one’s true nature. This language assumes a “true self” from which one can deviate (Laing, 1960).

Behavioral and Functional Terms

Vocabulary describing action reveals assumptions about agency and determinism. Comportare (“to bring together”) becomes “comportment” and, through French, “behavior”—framing action as something composed rather than spontaneous. Habitus (“condition,” “appearance,” “dress”) gives us “habit” and “habitual,” concepts Bourdieu (1977) later theorized as embodied social structures.

Motivus (“moving”) creates “motivation” and “motive,” suggesting that action requires an internal force that moves the organism (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Voluntas (“will,” “wish”) provides “volition” and “voluntary,” embedding assumptions about free will and autonomous choice that are culturally specific to Western liberalism (Markus & Kitayama, 2010).

Addiction and Anxiety: Case Studies in Embedded Assumptions

Two terms particularly reveal the political work that psychological language performs: addiction and anxiety.

Addiction

Addictus in Roman law meant “assigned by decree, bound over, enslaved”—specifically, a person legally enslaved to a creditor for unpaid debts (Lewis & Short, 1879). The term literally means “handed over” (ad- “to” + dicere “to say/declare”). This etymological heritage frames addiction as bondage and loss of freedom, importing a distinctly liberal framework that assumes a prior state of autonomy that was lost (Levine, 1978).

The implications are profound. Addiction is conceptualized as enslavement to a substance—not relationship with it, but ownership by it (Alexander, 2008). This legal and moral language makes addiction about willpower and responsibility rather than adaptation, relationship, or cultural context (Hart, 2013). The root dicere also gives us “dictate,” “verdict,” and “contradict”—all about authority and declaration. Addiction language implies that something else is now speaking for you, controlling you, dictating your actions.

This addiction-as-slavery metaphor serves specific political functions: it frames the substance as oppressor rather than examining why people seek altered states; it locates the problem in the individual rather than in social conditions; it justifies punitive intervention under the guise of “freeing” the enslaved through coercion, imprisonment, or forced treatment; and it maps onto Protestant notions of sin and redemption, fall from grace and recovery/salvation (Valverde, 1998; White, 1998).

Alternative frameworks exist. Some Indigenous languages describe similar phenomena as being in excessive relationship with a substance or as spirit imbalance—conceptualizations that preserve relationality and context rather than individual bondage (Coyhis & Simonelli, 2008).

Anxiety

Anxius (“troubled,” “uneasy,” “distressed”) derives from angere (“to choke,” “strangle,” “cause distress”). The physical root is literal: the sensation of being strangled, having one’s throat constricted (Starobinski, 2003). Related words from the same root include angina (throat pain, chest pain), anguish (from angustia, “narrowness,” “tightness”), and even anger.

This etymology reveals anxiety as fundamentally somatic—physical constriction before cognitive worry. The root conceptualizes anxiety as something that grips you from outside, a narrowing of possibilities, a feeling of being choked by circumstances (May, 1950). In its original Latin usage, anxietas was a reasonable response to danger—not pathological but adaptive.

Modern psychology transformed anxiety into Generalized Anxiety Disorder—anxiety without appropriate cause, where the problem is excessive or irrational worry (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The “narrowing” becomes cognitive (restricted thinking) rather than existential (actually being trapped). This shift is politically significant: by pathologizing anxiety as a disorder, psychology treats it with medication and therapy aimed at the individual while ignoring that people might be reasonably “choking” under economic precarity, climate crisis, political oppression, or social atomization (Horwitz & Wakefield, 2012).

The language allows us to ask “Why are you anxious?” (individual pathology) rather than “What is choking you?” (systemic analysis). Christian theology added moral dimensions: acedia (sloth) involved sinful anxiety and restlessness, and anxiety indicated lack of faith (“Be anxious for nothing”—Philippians 4:6). Modern psychology secularized this structure but kept its architecture: anxiety becomes a personal failing requiring treatment—the new salvation (Herzberg, 2009).

Latin as Imperial Precision: The Architecture of Objectivity

Latin was the language of Roman law, Catholic doctrine, and European empire—systems built on classification, hierarchy, legal distinctions, and binary thinking (Ziolkowski, 2007). When psychology professionalized in the 19th century, it borrowed this taxonomic impulse, inheriting a worldview where mental states can be objectively categorized, deviations from norms are pathologies, and the individual is a bounded, rational agent—essentially the Cartesian/Christian soul repackaged in scientific terminology (Danziger, 1990; Richards, 2010).

Religious Substrates in “Scientific” Language

Contemporary psychological terminology carries theological baggage that shapes ostensibly secular concepts. Conscientiaoriginally referred to moral knowledge, knowing right from wrong in relationship with God. We secularized it into “consciousness” but retained the assumption of an interior moral witness, an observing self that judges experience (Taylor, 1989).

Personality, from personae, was transformed by Christianity from theatrical mask to immortal individual soul—unified, continuous, morally responsible (Mauss, 1985). Modern personality theory assumes this unity rather than multiplicity or context-dependent selves, marginalizing non-Western concepts of personhood (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

The passion/reason binary—passio versus ratio—structures Christian anthropology and persists in modern psychology’s distinction between emotion and cognition, “passionate” versus “rational,” “emotional” versus “logical” (Solomon, 1993). Virtue ethics becomes positive psychology; the seven deadly sins map onto personality disorders: pride becomes narcissistic personality disorder, wrath becomes intermittent explosive disorder, sloth becomes depression (Schimmel, 1997).

The Political Economy of Diagnosis

Psychological language reveals who gets to be “normal.” Hysteria, from Greek hystera (“womb”), pathologized women’s anger and non-compliance as a uterine disorder (Showalter, 1985). Drapetomania, a 19th-century diagnosis invented by physician Samuel Cartwright, described enslaved people’s “disease” of fleeing captivity—medical language concealing political control (Cartwright, 1851). Homosexuality remained in the DSM as pathology until 1973, encoding Christian sexual norms as psychiatric fact (Drescher, 2015).

These examples demonstrate that diagnostic language does not neutrally describe natural categories but rather enforces social hierarchies (Foucault, 1965; Szasz, 1974). The Latin terminology creates an appearance of timeless scientific objectivity while performing immediate political work: justifying coercion, marginalizing dissent, and naturalizing power relations (Conrad & Schneider, 1992).

The Subject/Object Split: Grammatical Foundations of Dualism

Latin grammar and philosophy bequeathed the subject-object divide that structures Western psychology. Descartes’ ego cogito (“I think”) places consciousness as an interior observer, creating mind/body dualism, self/world separation, and the observer/observed distinction (Descartes, 1641/1996). This grammatical structure—subject performing action on object—becomes ontology: a self that has experiences rather than being a process, mental states as properties of individuals rather than relational or contextual phenomena, and the possibility of objective observation of subjective states (Sampson, 1993).

Many non-Western languages do not grammatically require this split. Languages with more relational grammar—including many Indigenous and East Asian languages—construct selfhood as inherently embedded in relationships, not as discrete units (Kövecses, 2005). Yet Western psychology assumes Cartesian subjectivity as universal human nature rather than culturally specific construction (Shweder, 1991).

Anglo-American Individualism: Protestant Self-Determination in Psychological Language

English-language psychology particularly emphasizes agency and autonomy, reflecting Protestant self-determination (Bellah et al., 1985). Concepts like “self-esteem,” “self-actualization,” and “self-efficacy” are distinctly American, assuming the self is a project to be worked on, improved, and maximized (Cushman, 1990, 1995). Personal responsibility for mental health individualizes what might be collective or structural problems (Illouz, 2008).

This contrasts sharply with languages and cultures emphasizing interdependence, where well-being is achieved through harmonious relationships rather than individual achievement (Kitayama et al., 2009). The dominance of English in international psychology spreads these individualistic assumptions globally, often pathologizing collectivist orientations (Arnett, 2008).

The Standardization Paradox: Universal Claims, Cultural Particularity

The DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and ICD (World Health Organization, 2019) claim universal objectivity, but they reflect Euro-American middle-class norms about productivity, emotional regulation, and relationships (Kleinman, 1988). They pathologize responses to oppression, giving people disorders rather than changing oppressive conditions—what Watters (2010) calls “the Americanization of mental illness.”

Latin and Greek terminology creates the appearance of scientific neutrality while encoding specific cultural values (Young, 1995). Consider Major Depressive Disorder: the diagnosis assumes depression is an individual brain problem rather than social or economic; normal functioning includes productivity and positive affect; and the baseline is a stable, autonomous self. These are culturally specific assumptions dressed in objective language (Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007).

The addiction-anxiety complex exemplifies this process. Both terms externalize agency (you are enslaved, you are being choked) while blaming the individual (you have the disorder). They frame normal human responses to difficult conditions as pathologies, use visceral physical metaphors that feel self-evident, and obscure power relations by medicalizing social problems as individual disorders (Conrad, 2007).

Contemporary framing of “anxiety and addiction epidemics” medicalizes what might be rational responses to late capitalism, creates massive pharmaceutical markets, locates solutions in individual treatment rather than social change, and uses Latin roots to make these frameworks seem natural and obvious (Davies, 2013; Fisher, 2009).

Implications and Conclusions

By using Latin roots, Western psychology naturalizes its own metaphysics (Gergen, 1985). Ancient language makes cultural categories feel timeless and universal rather than historically constructed and politically useful. Psychology does not simply describe psychological reality—it creates it through language that already contains assumptions about selfhood, normality, morality, and what it means to be human (Hacking, 1995).

Understanding these etymological foundations has several important implications:

For clinical practice: Clinicians must recognize that diagnostic language is not neutral but carries cultural assumptions that may not apply to diverse populations (Sue & Sue, 2016). Cultural formulation interviews and Indigenous healing practices offer alternatives to standardized Western approaches (Gone & Kirmayer, 2020).

For research: Psychology must acknowledge its cultural situatedness and avoid universalizing findings from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic (WEIRD) populations (Henrich et al., 2010). Cross-cultural research should examine how language shapes psychological experience rather than assuming universal categories (Lucy, 1992).

For theory: Alternative frameworks are possible. Instead of addiction as slavery, we might explore relationship and context; instead of anxiety as individual disorder, we might examine what circumstances are choking people; instead of personality as stable essence, we might study contextual performance of selfhood (Gergen, 2009; Harré, 1986).

For decolonization: Recognizing the Latin-Christian-imperial roots of psychological language is essential for decolonizing the discipline (Bulhan, 2015; Martín-Baró, 1994). This involves not just translating Western concepts but fundamentally questioning what counts as psychological knowledge and who gets to define it (Smith, 2012).

The language we inherited predetermines how we think about human experience—as individual pathologies requiring expert intervention rather than, perhaps, as collective suffering requiring social transformation (Prilleltensky & Nelson, 2002). Making visible the etymological architecture of psychology is a first step toward more reflexive, culturally humble, and potentially liberatory approaches to understanding human psychological life.

---

References

Alexander, B. K. (2008). The globalization of addiction: A study in poverty of the spirit. Oxford University Press.

American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (5th ed.). American Psychiatric Publishing.

Arnett, J. J. (2008). The neglected 95%: Why American psychology needs to become less American. American Psychologist, 63(7), 602-614.

Baumeister, R. F. (1987). How the self became a problem: A psychological review of historical research. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52(1), 163-176.

Bellah, R. N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W. M., Swidler, A., & Tipton, S. M. (1985). Habits of the heart: Individualism and commitment in American life. University of California Press.

Bettelheim, B. (1983). Freud and man’s soul. Alfred A. Knopf.

Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a theory of practice. Cambridge University Press.

Bulhan, H. A. (2015). Stages of colonialism in Africa: From occupation of land to occupation of being. Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 3(1), 239-256.

Canguilhem, G. (1989). The normal and the pathological. Zone Books.

Cartwright, S. A. (1851). Report on the diseases and physical peculiarities of the Negro race. New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, 7, 691-715.

Conrad, P. (2007). The medicalization of society: On the transformation of human conditions into treatable disorders. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Conrad, P., & Schneider, J. W. (1992). Deviance and medicalization: From badness to sickness. Temple University Press.

Coyhis, D., & Simonelli, R. (2008). The Native American healing experience. Substance Use & Misuse, 43(12-13), 1927-1949.

Cushman, P. (1990). Why the self is empty: Toward a historically situated psychology. American Psychologist, 45(5), 599-611.

Cushman, P. (1995). Constructing the self, constructing America: A cultural history of psychotherapy. Addison-Wesley.

Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain. Putnam.

Danziger, K. (1990). Constructing the subject: Historical origins of psychological research. Cambridge University Press.

Danziger, K. (1997). Naming the mind: How psychology found its language. Sage Publications.

Davies, J. (2013). Cracked: The unhappy truth about psychiatry. Icon Books.

Davis, L. J. (1995). Enforcing normalcy: Disability, deafness, and the body. Verso.

Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behavior. Plenum.

Descartes, R. (1996). Meditations on first philosophy (J. Cottingham, Trans.). Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1641)

Dixon, T. (2003). From passions to emotions: The creation of a secular psychological category. Cambridge University Press.

Drescher, J. (2015). Out of DSM: Depathologizing homosexuality. Behavioral Sciences, 5(4), 565-575.

Fisher, M. (2009). Capitalist realism: Is there no alternative? Zero Books.

Foucault, M. (1965). Madness and civilization: A history of insanity in the age of reason. Pantheon Books.

Gergen, K. J. (1985). The social constructionist movement in modern psychology. American Psychologist, 40(3), 266-275.

Gergen, K. J. (2009). An invitation to social construction (2nd ed.). Sage Publications.

Gone, J. P. (2013). Redressing First Nations historical trauma: Theorizing mechanisms for Indigenous culture as mental health treatment. Transcultural Psychiatry, 50(5), 683-706.

Gone, J. P., & Kirmayer, L. J. (2020). Advancing Indigenous mental health research: Ethical, conceptual and methodological challenges. Transcultural Psychiatry, 57(2), 235-249.

Hacking, I. (1995). Rewriting the soul: Multiple personality and the sciences of memory. Princeton University Press.

Harré, R. (1986). The social construction of emotions. Basil Blackwell.

Hart, C. (2013). High price: A neuroscientist’s journey of self-discovery that challenges everything you know about drugs and society. Harper Collins.

Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33(2-3), 61-83.

Herzberg, D. (2009). Happy pills in America: From Miltown to Prozac. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Hillman, J. (1975). Re-visioning psychology. Harper & Row.

Horwitz, A. V., & Wakefield, J. C. (2007). The loss of sadness: How psychiatry transformed normal sorrow into depressive disorder. Oxford University Press.

Horwitz, A. V., & Wakefield, J. C. (2012). All we have to fear: Psychiatry’s transformation of natural anxieties into mental disorders. Oxford University Press.

Illouz, E. (2008). Saving the modern soul: Therapy, emotions, and the culture of self-help. University of California Press.

Kirmayer, L. J., & Minas, H. (2000). The future of cultural psychiatry: An international perspective. Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 45(5), 438-446.

Kitayama, S., Duffy, S., & Uchida, Y. (2009). Self as mode of being. In S. Kitayama & D. Cohen (Eds.), Handbook of cultural psychology (pp. 136-174). Guilford Press.

Kleinman, A. (1988). Rethinking psychiatry: From cultural category to personal experience. Free Press.

Kövecses, Z. (2005). Metaphor in culture: Universality and variation. Cambridge University Press.

Laing, R. D. (1960). The divided self: An existential study in sanity and madness. Tavistock Publications.

Levine, H. G. (1978). The discovery of addiction: Changing conceptions of habitual drunkenness in America. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 39(1), 143-174.

Lewis, C. T., & Short, C. (1879). A Latin dictionary. Clarendon Press.

Lucy, J. A. (1992). Language diversity and thought: A reformulation of the linguistic relativity hypothesis. Cambridge University Press.

Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review, 98(2), 224-253.

Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (2010). Cultures and selves: A cycle of mutual constitution. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5(4), 420-430.

Martín-Baró, I. (1994). Writings for a liberation psychology (A. Aron & S. Corne, Eds.). Harvard University Press.

Mauss, M. (1985). A category of the human mind: The notion of person; the notion of self. In M. Carrithers, S. Collins, & S. Lukes (Eds.), The category of the person: Anthropology, philosophy, history (pp. 1-25). Cambridge University Press.

May, R. (1950). The meaning of anxiety. Ronald Press.

Panksepp, J. (1998). Affective neuroscience: The foundations of human and animal emotions. Oxford University Press.

Prilleltensky, I., & Nelson, G. (2002). Doing psychology critically: Making a difference in diverse settings. Palgrave Macmillan.

Richards, G. (2010). Putting psychology in its place: Critical historical perspectives (3rd ed.). Routledge.

Rose, N. (1998). Inventing our selves: Psychology, power, and personhood. Cambridge University Press.

Sampson, E. E. (1993). Celebrating the other: A dialogic account of human nature. Westview Press.

Schimmel, S. (1997). The seven deadly sins: Jewish, Christian, and classical reflections on human psychology. Oxford University Press.

Showalter, E. (1985). The female malady: Women, madness, and English culture, 1830-1980. Pantheon Books.

Shweder, R. A. (1991). Thinking through cultures: Expeditions in cultural psychology. Harvard University Press.

Smith, L. T. (2012). Decolonizing methodologies: Research and Indigenous peoples (2nd ed.). Zed Books.

Smith, R. (1988). Does the history of psychology have a subject? History of the Human Sciences, 1(2), 147-177.

Solomon, R. C. (1993). The passions: Emotions and the meaning of life. Hackett Publishing.

Starobinski, J. (2003). Action and reaction: The life and adventures of a couple. Zone Books.

Sue, D. W., & Sue, D. (2016). Counseling the culturally diverse: Theory and practice (7th ed.). Wiley.

Szasz, T. S. (1974). The myth of mental illness: Foundations of a theory of personal conduct (Rev. ed.). Harper & Row.

Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity. Harvard University Press.

Valverde, M. (1998). Diseases of the will: Alcohol and the dilemmas of freedom. Cambridge University Press.

Watters, E. (2010). Crazy like us: The globalization of the American psyche. Free Press.

White, W. L. (1998). Slaying the dragon: The history of addiction treatment and recovery in America. Chestnut Health Systems.

Whorf, B. L. (1956). Language, thought, and reality: Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf (J. B. Carroll, Ed.). MIT Press.

World Health Organization. (2019). International statistical classification of diseases and related health problems (11th ed.). World Health Organization.

Young, A. (1995). The harmony of illusions: Inventing post-traumatic stress disorder. Princeton University Press.

Ziolkowski, J. M. (2007). Latin culture in the eleventh century (Vols. 1-2). Cambridge University Press.